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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND 
GUANTÁNAMO 
Gregory S. McNeal
In this essay I draw attention to the intersection between the social scientific 
literature on organizational culture and the legal ethics literature. Drawing 
from the organizational theory literature I detail a framework for assessing 
organizational culture and explain how organizational culture reflects more 
than rules and structure within an organization, but rather represents dee-
per values, practices, and ways of thinking. While organizational culture is 
difficult to change, it can be modified or sustained through power, status, 
rewards, and other mechanisms. After establishing a baseline for assessing 
organizational culture I highlight efforts by the Bush administration to ex-
ercise control over a military culture which was resistant to the administra-
tion’s legal policy initiatives. This effort at control manifested itself in the 
creation of the military commissions in 2001, an attempt to minimize the 
influence of military attorneys in 2003, and efforts to exercise political con-
trol over military commissions in 2006; each effort was successfully resisted 
by members of the military. I conclude by observing that the literature on 
organizational culture can provide insights into the literature on legal eth-
ics and political control of the military specifically and political control of 
bureaucracies more generally.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this symposium essay I plan to highlight key points where the li-
terature on organizational culture can aid scholars in understanding the im-
pact of values, practices, and ethical rules on the behavior of attorneys with-
in politicized organizations. To accomplish this goal, I first detail a frame-
work for assessing organizational culture and explain how organizational 
culture reflects more than rules and structure within an organization, but 
rather represents deeper values, practices, and ways of thinking. Next, I use 
the example of the military commissions and the Bush administration’s in-
terrogation policy to demonstrate how the Bush administration tried unsuc-
cessfully to exercise control over a military culture which was resistant to 
its legal policy initiatives. I also explain how members of the military suc-
cessfully resisted these efforts to modify their organizational culture and 
 Gregory S. McNeal, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State Universi-
ty Dickinson School of Law. 
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resisted enhanced political control over the activities of the military. Taken 
together, these observations suggest that the literature on organizational 
culture can provide useful insights into the literature on legal ethics and 
political control of the military specifically and political control of bureau-
cracies more generally. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE THEORY
Organizational cultures are slowly evolving reflections of the 
shared and learned values, beliefs, and attitudes of an organization’s mem-
bers.1 Culture can be conceived of as a collection of unspoken rules and 
traditions that play a part in determining the quality and nature of organiza-
tional life.2 In short, “[t]he culture of an organization influences who gets 
promoted, how careers are either made or derailed, and how resources are 
allocated.”3 Organizational culture theory places its focus on “the culture 
that exists in an organization, something akin to a societal culture.”4 It ana-
lyzes “intangible phenomena, such as values, beliefs, assumptions, percep-
tions, behavioral norms, artifacts, and patterns of behavior.”5 Organizational 
culture is seen as “a social energy that moves people to act.”6 “Culture is to 
the organization what personality is to the individual—a hidden, yet unify-
ing theme that provides meaning, direction, and mobilization.”7 The organi-
zational culture perspective is an organizational theory with its own central 
assumptions, and, given its unique assumptions, it is a counterculture within 
organizational theory that differs from the rational schools.8
Organizational culture theory challenges rational perspectives re-
garding “how organizations make decisions and . . . why organizations—
1 DON HELLRIEGEL & JOHN W. SLOCUM, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 418 (2007).
2 Id.
3 Id. (noting that “organizational culture includes: routine ways of communicating, such 
as organizational rituals and ceremonies and the language commonly used; the norms shared 
by individuals and teams throughout the organization . . . the dominant values held by the 
organization . . . the philosophy that guides management’s policies and decision making . . . 
the rules of the game for getting along in the organization . . . the feeling or climate conveyed 
in an organization by the . . . way in which [organizational members] interact with . . . out-
siders.”). 
4 Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Theory and Counterterrorism Prosecutions: A 
Preliminary Inquiry, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 307, 325 (2009) (citing JAY M. SHAFRITZ & JAY 
STEVENS OTT, CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 352 (2005)).
5 McNeal, supra note 4 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4).
6 McNeal, supra note 4 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4 (citing RALPH H. KILMANN 
ET AL., GAINING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATE CULTURE, at xi (1985))).
7 McNeal, supra note 4 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4 (citing KILMANN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at ix)).
8 McNeal, supra note 4 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4).
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and people in [them]—act as they do.”9 Organizational culture theorists 
criticize the rational schools because while the rational schools have clearly 
stated assumptions, those assumptions are premised upon four organization-
al conditions that must exist for their theories to be valid, but those condi-
tions in practice rarely exist.10 Those assumptions are: “1. a self-correcting 
system of interdependent people; 2. [a] consensus on objectives and me-
thods; 3. coordination achieved through sharing information; and 4. predict-
able organizational problems and solutions.”11 Organizational culture theor-
ists contend that in the absence of those four conditions, “organizational 
behaviors and decisions are [instead] predetermined by the patterns of basic 
assumptions held by members of an organization. These patterns of assump-
tions continue to exist and to influence behaviors in an organization because 
they repeatedly have led people to make decisions that ‘worked in the 
past.’”12 Accordingly, “[w]ith repeated use, the assumptions slowly drop out 
of people’s consciousness but continue to influence organizational decisions 
and behaviors even when the environment changes and different decisions 
are needed.”13 Organizational culture explains the phenomenon of the 
phrase “that’s the way things are done here”—the organizational culture 
becomes “so basic, so ingrained, and so completely accepted that no one 
thinks about or remembers [the assumptions driving behavior].”14
Organizational culture theorists believe that “[a] strong organiza-
tional culture can control organizational behavior.”15 Such a culture “can 
block an organization from making [needed] changes” to adapt to its envi-
ronment.16 Moreover, “rules, authority, and norms of rational behavior do 
not restrain the personal preferences of organizational members. Instead, 
[members] are controlled by cultural norms, values, beliefs, and assump-
tions.”17 Across organizations, basic assumptions may differ, and organiza-
tional culture may be shaped by many factors, some of which may include 
societal culture, technologies, markets, competition, personality of founders, 
and personality of leaders.18
9 McNeal, supra note 4 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4).
Furthermore, the effect of organizational cul-
10 McNeal, supra note 4 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4).
11 McNeal, supra note 4 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4).
12 McNeal, supra note 4 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 352–53).
13 McNeal, supra note 4, at 325–26 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
14 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
15 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
16 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
17 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (quoting SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
18 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (citing SHAFRITZ & OTT, supra note 4, at 353).
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ture may be pervasive and may include subcultures with similar or distinct 
influence factors.19
Various aspects of organizational culture exist on different levels or
layers within an organization, and they differ in terms of visibility and resis-
tance to change. “[T]he least visible, or deepest, level of organizational cul-
ture is that of shared assumptions and philosophies, which represent basic 
beliefs about reality, human nature, and the way things should be done.”20
Organizational cultural values represent the next layer of organizational 
culture and tend to persist over time, even with changes in organizational 
membership.21 Organizational cultural values are the “collective beliefs, 
assumptions, and feelings about what things are good, normal, rational and 
valuable.”22 The next layer of organizational culture is represented by 
shared behaviors, which include “norms, which are more visible and 
somewhat easier to change than values.”23 The uppermost layer of organiza-
tional culture is the most visible and the most superficial. Cultural symbols
“are words, gestures, and pictures or other physical objects that carry a 
meaning with a culture.”24
“[O]rganizational culture forms in response to two major challenges 
that confront every organization: (1) external adaptation and survival and 
(2) internal integration.”25 External adaptation and survival refer to “how 
the organization will find a niche in and cope with its constantly changing 
external environment.”26 Internal integration refers to “the establishment 
and maintenance of effective working relationships among the members of 
an organization.”27 Organizational culture develops when organizational 
members share knowledge and assumptions in an effort to develop ways of 
coping with external adaptation and internal integration.28 External adapta-
tion and survival involves (1) mission and strategy; (2) goal setting; (3) 
means; and (4) measurement.29
19 McNeal, supra note 4, at 326 (citing J. STEVEN OTT, THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
PERSPECTIVE ch. 4 (1989)).
Internal integration refers to “the establish-
20 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 419 (emphasis in original).
21 Id.
22 Id. (citing C.B. Gibson & M.E. Zellmer-Bruhn, Metaphors and Meaning: An Intercul-
tural Analysis of the Scope of Teamwork, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 274 (2001)) (emphasis omitted).
23 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 419 (emphasis omitted).
24 Id. (citing E.H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP (1985)) (emphasis 
omitted).
25 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 421 (citing E.H. SCHEIN, supra note 24, at 49–
84). 
26 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 421 (emphasis omitted).
27 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
28 Id.
29 Id.
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ment and maintenance of effective working relationships among the mem-
bers of an organization.”30
III. AN EXAMPLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT
It involves; (1) language and concepts; (2) group 
and team boundaries; (3) power and status; and (4) rewards and punish-
ments. 
The military commissions established to try alleged terrorists after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 were adopted by the Bush administration 
operating pursuant to an expansive view of executive authority which some 
have labeled a “New Paradigm.”31 This plenary interpretation of presiden-
tial war power is based on a reading of the Constitution that few legal scho-
lars share.32 It states that “the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the 
authority to disregard virtually all previously known boundaries, if national 
security demands it.”33
[T]he Pentagon to bring terrorists to justice as swiftly as possible. Criminal 
courts and military courts, with their exacting standards of evidence and 
emphasis on protecting defendants’ rights, were deemed too cumbersome. 
Instead, the President authorized a system of detention and interrogation 
that operated outside the international standards for the treatment of pris-
oners of war by the 1949 Geneva Conventions. . . . In November, 2001, 
[Vice President] Cheney said of the military commissions, “We think it 
guarantees that we’ll have the kind of treatment of these individuals that 
we believe they deserve.”
The public policy behind the New Paradigm was to 
allow: 
34
The military commissions which Vice President Cheney referred to 
were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld35 and were 
replaced by military commissions created by the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 (MCA). The MCA, though, featured a command structure which 
created a culture within the military commissions system wrought with po-
litical influence. One statutory provision designates a political appointee to 
serve in the powerful role of Convening Authority,36
30 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
while a second statuto-
31 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House’s 
War on Terror, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
archive/2006/07/03/060703fa_fact1.
32 Id. at 44. 
33 Id.
34 Id. at 46. 
35 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006).
36 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(h), 120 Stat. 2600. 
(“Military commissions under this chapter may be convened by the Secretary of Defense or 
by any officer or official of the United States designated by the Secretary for that purpose.”).
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ry provision provides trial counsel with enhanced protection from undue 
influence.37 The legislative history of the MCA suggests that congressional 
drafters accepted legislation proposed by the White House in September 
2006,38 and while Congress added to the bill an important protection against 
undue influence,39 they failed to consider how that provision would interact 
with other provisions within the bill. Moreover, the protection Congress 
intended to extend to trial counsel has been largely undermined by a broad 
delegation of authority to the Executive branch to promulgate rules for mili-
tary commissions outside the normal rulemaking procedures.40 As a result, 
the Department of Defense took advantage of the opportunity to exercise 
control over military commissions and created a structure and promulgated 
rules for the military commissions which allowed for political manipulation 
of nearly all aspects of the trials. It is possible that the creation of this cul-
ture of political influence was intentional, a point I will elaborate on 
below.41
Section 948(h) of the MCA declares: “Military commissions under 
this chapter may be convened by the Secretary of Defense or by any officer
or official of the United States designated by the Secretary for that pur-
pose.”42 This seemingly innocuous provision allows the Secretary of De-
fense to select a civilian political appointee to serve in the important role of 
Convening Authority, a substantial departure from courts-martial practice.43
37 Id. § 949(b).
This raises an obvious problem: a political appointee lacks the presumption 
38 See Gregory S. McNeal, Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 967 (2009).
39 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 949(b), 120 Stat. 2600.
40 See Letter from Barry M. Kamins, President, The Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York, to Senators Patrick Leahy, Arlen Specter, Carl Levin, and John McCain and 
Representatives John Conyers, Lamar S. Smith, Ike Skelton, and Duncan Hunter (Mar. 12, 
2008), available at http://www.harpers.org/media/image/blogs/misc/guantanamoletter
remc311.pdf (discussing the urgent need for Congressional oversight hearings given the 
potential for undue political influence and organizational changes which impact the indepen-
dence of the military commissions). See also Eugene R. Fidell, Military Commissions &
Administrative Law, 6 GREEN BAG 379, 382 (2003), available at http://www.nimj.
org/documents/GreenBag.pdf. (stating that transparency in the form of notice and comment 
rulemaking for military commissions can contribute to public confidence in government 
decision-making and improved decisions). 
41 See Letter from Barry M. Kamins, supra note 40, at 3 (stating “this restructuring places 
the General Counsel [a political appointee] at the apex of the military commissions system 
with the power to influence and direct it from every perspective” and “the supervisory struc-
ture underlying the military commissions . . . establishes a blueprint for conflict and political 
influence on the prosecution and conduct of the military commissions.”). 
42 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948(h), 120 Stat. 2600 (em-
phasis added).
43 Cf. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 822 (2006).
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of unbiased and apolitical decision-making that accompanies the role of a 
military commander.44 The Convening Authority is a unique official with 
no civilian equivalent.45 In the case of the commissions, she also has no 
military equivalent; her position exists solely for the purpose of trying one 
class of alleged offenders. The Convening Authority’s responsibilities in-
clude reviewing the sufficiency of charges and whether they should be dis-
missed, selecting those cases and associated charges that should be referred 
to trial by military commission, selecting members of the panel (the jury), 
and reviewing findings of guilt and sentences.46
In Section 948(h), Congress created a Convening Authority with all 
the power found in military commanders but without the attendant com-
mand responsibility justification; moreover, by allowing this individual to 
be a political appointee, Congress allowed for the creation of a politically-
motivated organizational culture in what should be an apolitical organiza-
tional culture. It is certainly up to Congress to prescribe “the level of inde-
pendence and procedural rigor” of military courts.47 But Section 948(h) also 
implicates the broader protections of the trial process, and in this respect is 
governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which is con-
cerned with “matters of structure, organization, and mechanisms to promote 
the tribunal’s insulation from command influence.”48 It is not clear that 
Common Article 3 would prohibit an organizational culture that was driven 
by politics, as politics are an accepted aspect of many ordinary criminal 
trials. However, in his concurrence in the Hamdan opinion, Justice Kennedy 
made clear that a major failure of the military commissions which preceded 
those created by the MCA of 2006 was that they were not structurally inde-
pendent.49
The organizational culture and political influence point is key to 
understanding what section 948(h)’s impact isby allowing for a politically 
appointed convening authority it violates the principle that military justice 
should be insulated from a politically motivated organizational culture. 
44 Convening Authority under the UCMJ are commanders and military officers. Id. As 
such they are protected from removal from their position, and any such removal would raise 
significant questions especially in light of their other non-judicial responsibilities. See id. §
804 (granting an officer the right to challenge his or her dismissal in a trial by court-martial).
45 See Lindsay Nicole Alleman, Who Is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The Disciplinary 
Role of the Commander in Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 169, 170 
(2006).
46 DEP’T OF DEF., THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, pt. 2., § 2-3, (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2007/Reg_for_Trial_by_mcm.pdf. 
47 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
48 Id. at 646.
49 Id. See also id. at 645 (“[A]n acceptable degree of independence from the Executive is 
necessary to render a commission ‘regularly constituted’ by the standards of our Nation’s 
system of justice.”).
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Stated differently, structural insulation for military justice is designed to 
ensure that a system exists which protects against political influence irres-
pective of the motivation of individual actors. What the Supreme Court 
made clear in Hamdan was that the Court was not imputing ill motives to 
any actors within the military commission process, which would include 
political appointees.50 Rather, the Court expressed its certainty that officers 
in the PMO military commissions “would strive to act impartially and en-
sure that Hamdan receive[d] all protections to which he is entitled.”51 None-
theless, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, 
reasoned that “the legality of a tribunal under Common Article 3 cannot be 
established by bare assurances that, whatever the character of the court or 
the procedures it follows, individual adjudicators will act fairly.”52 Structur-
al independence from the influence of Executive actors is the central con-
cern.53 Section 948(h), by departing from this guidance, created a political-
ly-motivated organizational culture and institutional structure which 
allowed for instances of perceived and actual political influence and 
coercion.54
This possibility of undue political influence is not merely hypothet-
ical or theoretical; in fact, Military Commission Judge Keith Allred in the 
military commission trial of Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s body 
guard, removed the Legal Advisor to the Convening Authority from the 
Hamdan military commission trial citing “substantial doubts” about that 
50 Id. at 587 (majority opinion).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 634 n.67. While Justice Kennedy did not join this part of the opinion, he did later 
recognize the importance of ensuring individual adjudicators would act fairly and impartial-
ly. On page fourteen of his concurrence he analyzed the powers of the Convening Authority 
in courts martial and stated: 
[B]y structure and tradition, the court-martial process is insulated from those who 
have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings . . . . As compared to the role of 
the convening authority in a court-martial, the greater powers of the Appointing 
Authority here . . . raise[s] concerns that the commission’s decision making may 
not be neutral.
Id. at 649–50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 645, 650 (stating “an acceptable degree of independence from the Executive is 
necessary to render a commission ‘regularly constituted’ by the standards of our Nation’s 
system of justice” and that “provisions for review of legal issues after trial cannot correct for 
structural defects . . . that can cast doubt on the fact finding process . . . .”). 
54 Cf. GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
TOGETHER WITH THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF COURTS-MARTIAL AND OTHER MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS, 623–24 (1915) (rehearsing the judge advocate’s oath to the allegiance of the 
court).
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advisor’s independence from the prosecutorial function.55 Moreover, Colo-
nel Davis, the Chief Prosecutor of the military commissions, resigned after 
criticizing the process for its politically-motivated undue command influ-
ence.56 He was subsequently notified that, because of his resignation, he did 
“not serve honorably” and was denied a medal for his service as prosecu-
tor.57 This form of “award discipline” is an example of how organizational 
culture theorists note that organizational culture can be maintained or 
changed, specifically by the system of rewards, status, and sanctions within 
an organization. “The rewards and punishments attached to various beha-
viors convey to [organizational members] the priorities and values of both 
individual [leaders] and the organization.”58 Status also affects certain as-
pects of an organization’s culture by demonstrating which roles and beha-
viors are valued by the organization.59 “An organization’s reward practices 
and culture are strongly linked in the minds of its members,” and some ar-
gue the use of rewards and status symbols is the “most effective method of 
influencing organizational culture . . . .”60 “[T]he criteria used to determine 
who is assigned to specific jobs or positions, who gets raises and promo-
tions and why, who is removed from the organization by firing or early re-
tirement, and so on, reinforce and demonstrate basic aspects of an organiza-
tion’s culture. These criteria become known throughout the organization 
and can maintain or change an existing culture.”61
Military justice precedents set forth a clear standard for testing 
whether officials improperly influenced subordinates. The test turns on 
“whether a reasonable member of the public, if aware of all the facts, would 
have a loss of confidence in the military justice system and believe it to be 
Such an act of discipline 
against Colonel Davis, a critic of what he viewed as unjust political decision 
making and interference in military justice, sent a message that those who 
resist the demands of the political culture supervising the military commis-
sions could expect reprisals should they fail to follow the goals of their po-
litical superiors.
55 Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Unlawful Influence) at 12, United States v. Hamdan, 
D-026 (Military Comm’n, May 9, 2008), available at http://www.nimj.org/documents/
Hamdan%20Hartmann%20Ruling.pdf.
56 See Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantánamo Bay: The Arrival of the 
High Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115 (2009).
57 Josh White, Colonel Says Speaking Out Cost a Medal, WASH. POST, May 29, 2008, 
at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/28/
AR2008052802966.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
58 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 425.
59 See id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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unfair.”62 In light of the retaliation against Colonel Davis, this test seems 
satisfied. In sum, the military commissions’ hierarchy is an example of an 
organizational culture which demands subservience to Executive branch 
political concerns. This subservience violates the spirit of Hamdan which 
repeatedly referenced the need for structural freedom from a culture of un-
due political influence.63
As will be made clear in the discussion which follows, organiza-
tional culture can be influenced and enforced in a variety of ways. For ex-
ample, by allowing political officials to prepare fitness reports and make 
decisions regarding service medals, a political appointee can have the same 
potential for influence over trials that they would have if they were able to 
directly control the decisions of organizational members. Moreover, an or-
ganizational culture which can allow leaders to push difficult and ethically 
challenging decisions to subordinates allows political appointees to escape 
the consequences of potentially unlawful action by pressuring military of-
ficers to act in their stead, forcing those officers to choose between resigna-
tion, reprisal, or violations of the law. The military commissions are one 
example of the Bush administration’s efforts to alter a military culture and 
substitute it with a political culture, and they stand as an example of how 
such efforts can negatively impact ethical decision making. Other examples 
during the Bush administration highlight how the military commissions 
were but one of many instances in a concerted effort to exercise greater po-
litical control over the military. This desire for control was rooted in the fact 
that the military’s culture largely resisted efforts to establish new and ques-
tionable legal procedures, disregarding years of established practices 
grounded in respect for the rule of law. 
IV. AN INTENTIONAL POLICY?
Is it accurate to suggest that the military commissions example re-
flects a broader effort to establish a politically driven culture within the mil-
itary? Some of the other actions of the Bush administration suggest that this 
is, in fact, the case. Bruce Fein, former Associate Attorney General in the 
Reagan administration observed that Bush’s presidential legal advisors had 
“staked out powers that are a universe beyond any other administration. 
This President has made claims that are really quite alarming. He has said 
that “there are no restraints on his ability, as he sees it, to collect intelli-
gence, to open mail, to commit torture, and to use electronic surveillance.”64
62 United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990) (citing United States v. 
Rosser, 6 M.J. 267 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Cruz, 20 M.J. 873, 890 (A.C.M.R. 
1985)).
63 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 587–88 (2006).
64 Mayer, supra note 31.
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Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, perhaps unwittingly, provided ammu-
nition to critics of the administration’s approach when he stated:
The nature of the new war [against terrorism] places a high premium on 
other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from cap-
tured terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities 
against American civilians, and the need to try terrorists for war crimes 
such as wantonly killing civilians. In my judgment, this new paradigm 
renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy pris-
oners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured 
enemy be afforded such things as commissary privileges, scrip (i.e., ad-
vances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments.65
It is in light of these political goals that we must consider what type 
of organizational culture was associated with the placement of political ap-
pointees within a command structure previously reserved for uniformed 
military officers. Organizational culture theorists contend that organizations 
can maintain their culture by recruiting individuals that fit the culture and 
removing those who consistently or markedly stray from accepted behaviors 
and activities.66 However, organizational culture involves more than just the 
quality of personnel inputs and outputs. Other indicators of organizational 
culture include: “(1) what managers and teams pay attention to, measure, 
and control; (2) the ways in which managers react to critical incidents and 
organizational crises; . . . (4) [sic] criteria for allocating rewards and status; 
(5) criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, and removal from the or-
ganization; and (6) organizational rites, ceremonies and stories.”67 Similar-
ly, these same five elements can be used to modify organizational culture.68
Most large, complex organizations have more than one culture, referred to 
as “subcultures.” The subculture may reflect the operating culture of line 
employees, the professional or technical culture, and an executive culture of 
top management, each stemming from different views typically held by 
individuals in these differing roles.69
Applying these factors to the Bush administration’s approach to the 
government’s counterterrorism initiatives generally and the military com-
65 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President to George W. Bush, 
President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://slate.
com/features/whatistorture/LegalMemos.html; 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006).
66 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 423.
67 Id. (citing J.A. Chatman et al., Being Different Yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of 
Demographic Composition and Organizational Culture on Work Process and Outcomes, 43 
ADMIN. SCI. Q., 749–79 (1998)). 
68 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 467.
69 Id. (citing J.B. Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm 
Performance, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 70–91 (2002)). 
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missions specifically reveals some key insights about a politically driven 
organizational culture. Organizational culture theorists note that to maintain 
or change an organizational culture requires the attention of management 
and leadership. The “processes and behaviors that managers, individual 
employees, and teams pay attention to—that is, the events that get noticed 
and commented on” will largely control whether the organizational culture 
is sustained or changed.70
The General Counsel [in the Department of Defense] is first and foremost 
a political appointee nominated by the President based on loyalty and 
commitment to supporting a policy program. . . . Judge advocates, on the 
other hand, are not political appointees, but nevertheless, above the rank of 
captain require Senate approval of their regular commissions. While the 
President can dismiss his General Counsel, dismissing judge advocates is 
an altogether different procedural matter. . . . Politically appointed General 
Counsels have a different purpose and function in the [Department of De-
fense]. They are about partisan policy implementation, whereas judge ad-
vocates are about constitutional and statutory duties devoid of partisan pol-
icy considerations.
Stated differently, how an organization deals with 
events sends strong signals about what is important and expected of mem-
bers of an organization. The leadership in the military commissions process 
and those responsible for the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policy 
generation, all of whom report directly to political appointeesor were 
political appointees themselvesreacted to the military’s resistance to “the 
New Paradigm” by seeking to diminish their influence. These political ap-
pointees had goals which were, by their very nature, different than un-
iformed members of the military. As one scholar has noted with reference to 
the senior civilian attorneys within the Department of Defense:
71
As some prominent legal scholars and former military officers point 
out, the differences between these organizational cultures can have a palpa-
ble impact on legal policy because in many respects, “[m]ilitary lawyers 
seem to conceive of the rule of law differently [than their civilian counter-
parts]. Instead of seeing law as a barrier to the exercise of their clients’ 
power, these attorneys understand the law as a prerequisite to the meaning-
ful exercise of power. Law allows our troops to engage in forceful, violent 
acts with relatively little hesitation or moral qualms. Law makes just wars 
possible by creating a well-defined legal space within which individual sol-
70 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 423.
71 Gregory M. Huckabee, The Politicizing of Military Law—Fruit of the Poisonous Tree 
13–14 (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/gregory_huckabee/1 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Berkeley Electronic Press).
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diers can act without resorting to their own personal moral codes.”72 Impor-
tantly, the White House’s legislative efforts to insert a provision into the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006, which ensured that the powerful Con-
vening Authority for Military Commissions would be a political appointee, 
was not the first effort by the Bush administration to decrease the influence 
of uniformed military attorneys. On May 15, 2003, the Secretary of the Air 
Force issued “Secretary of the Air Force Order (SAFO) 111.5. . . . [The] 
SAFO gave the General Counsel broad authority to set legal policy for the 
Department, . . . and to review all legal training within the Department. In 
particular, he made the General Counsel ‘solely responsible . . . for legal 
aspects of major matters arising in or involving the Department . . . .”73 In 
addition, the Office of the Judge Advocate General was given a “‘dotted 
line reporting relationship to the General Counsel, serving as the Principal 
Military Advisor to the General Counsel.’”74 “Predictably all Service Judge 
Advocates General felt threatened by such a unilateral executive act.”75 The 
Secretary’s order in effect gave the Department General Counsel executive 
authority over the Service TJAG. In many respects, this earlier change, uti-
lizing a dotted line of authority, reflected a similar hierarchy of control hid-
den through dotted line authorities, just like that found in the Legal Advisor 
to the Convening Authority and Convening Authority positions in the Mili-
tary Commissions.76
In 2003, Congress responded negatively to the Bush administra-
tion’s efforts to establish a political culture that superseded independent 
military legal advice, sending:
[A]n unmistakable message to the Pentagon civilian political leadership, 
[which caused] Congress [to] enact[ ] legislation stating that no officer or 
employee of the Department of Defense may interfere with the ability of 
the Judge Advocates General to give independent legal advice to their re-
spective Secretary or Service Chief, or the ability of judge advocates in the 
military units to give independent legal advice to commanders. . . . In its 
report, Congress wanted to send the [Department of Defense] political lea-
dership a message. It made its point clear by stating that this was “the 
72 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Voices from the Stars? America’s Generals and Public Debates,
28 A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 4, 10 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.
org/natsecurity/nslr.shtml#volume_28 (quoting Richard Schragger, Cooler Heads: The Dif-
ference Between the President’s Lawyer and the Military’s, SLATE, Sept. 20, 2006, http://
www.slate.com/id/2150050).
73 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 10. 
74 Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, SEC’Y OF THE AIR FORCE ORDER 111.5,
FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
(May 15, 2003)). 
75 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 8.
76 See Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 29, 32–41 (2008). See generally McNeal, supra note 38, at 967.
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second time in 12 years that attempts to consolidate legal services in the 
Department of Defense have led to Congressional action [overruling it].77
A 2005 independent panel of experts analyzing the 2003 legislation con-
cluded: “The legislation, therefore, appears to set a boundary on Secretarial 
discretion to give executive control of the legal function of a Military De-
partment to the General Counsel and to subordinate the Judge Advocate 
General to the General Counsel’s organization.”78 Notably absent from the 
independent panel of experts report was an observation in an earlier draft 
where the expert noted “this discord has been largely confined within the 
walls of the Pentagon, and generally it appears not to have impacted com-
manders in the field. Nonetheless, it is unhealthy and must be resolved.”79
Unfortunately, in 2006, perhaps due to the rushed pace of legislation,80
Taken together, what one can see from the Bush administration’s 
efforts to establish military commissions by executive order in 2001, to di-
minish the authority of uniformed military attorneys in 2003, and to insert 
political control over the military commissions in 2006, is that there was a 
concerted organizational effort to establish enhanced political control at the 
expense of military culture. The Bush administration’s standard response to 
events which demonstrated the resistance of military culture to perceived 
violations of the rule of law was to diminish the power of the military, ra-
ther than to heed its advice. These points will become clearer in the sections 
that follow, as I will illustrate the clash between the existing military culture 
grounded in respect for international law and customs, and the emergent 
political culture within the Bush administration which sought a change in 
established doctrine as a means of achieving specific policy goals. 
Congress failed to recognize the Bush administration’s second attempt to 
undermine the uniformed military and allowed for the creation of a civilian 
Convening Authority within the military commissions. 
V. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, ETHICAL BEHAVIOR, AND “PUSHBACK”
Some may question what impact the examples detailed above could 
have on an organization. In fact, as a normative matter it is fair to suggest 
77 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 10–11 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 574, 118 Stat. 1811; 
H. REP. NO. 108-767, at 682 (2004)). 
78 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 11–12 (citing LEGAL SERVICES IN THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
ADVANCING PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 18 (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.
wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/35196dbc-fad7-45ad-bc44-5c27d03b4897/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/745b0324-5de9-4d69-8d6f-5fec9cf3761f/Preston_DODReport_
0905.pdf). 
79 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 12 (citing LEGAL SERVICES IN THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
ADVANCING PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 26 (Aug. 10, 2005) (draft)). 
80 See McNeal, supra note 38, at 1005–14.
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that increased political controls over the military are, in the abstract, a good 
thing. In light of these considerations, one must consider whether a change 
in organizational culture can have an impact on ethical behavior. More spe-
cifically, can a change in organizational culture from an apolitical to a polit-
ical one affect ethical decision-making within the military? How might such 
a change manifest itself? I contend that one way in which such a change 
might manifest itself is through a perception on the part of the military that 
their customs and practices, grounded in military culture and ethics, were 
being abandoned. On this point it is important to highlight some key obser-
vations noted by organizational theorists: “[o]rganizational culture involves 
a complex interplay of formal and informal systems that may support either 
ethical or unethical behavior.”81 Thus, an organizational culture like the 
military’s, which “emphasiz[es] ethical norms[,] provides support for ethi-
cal behavior.”82 Organizational leaders can thereby play a key role in estab-
lishing organizational culture by rewarding moral priorities and influencing 
how organizational members behave; “the presence or absence of ethical 
behavior in managerial actions both influences and reflects the culture.”83
The implications of these theories for military decision making are clear; 
organizational members can take a variety of steps to reduce unethical be-
havior, such as “secretly or publicly reporting unethical actions to a higher 
level within the organization; secretly or publicly reporting unethical actions 
to someone outside the organization; secretly or publicly threatening an 
offender or a responsible manager with reporting unethical actions; or quiet-
ly or publicly refusing to implement an unethical order or policy.”84
In practical terms, the Bush administration’s counterterrorism poli-
cy development reflected a disregard for the potential impact that political-
ly-motivated decisions, which failed to respect established organizational 
This 
type of reporting, or “push back,” can protect an existing organizational 
culture from change, can expose tension in an evolving organizational cul-
ture, and can shed light on what dissenters believe the culture of an organi-
zation should be. The example of push back by senior military attorneys 
against Bush administration counterterrorism policies illustrates these 
concepts. 
81 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 433 (explaining that “[f]ormal systems include 
leadership, structure, policies, reward systems, orientation and training programs, and deci-
sion making processes. Informal systems include norms, heroes, rituals, language, myths, 
sagas, and stories.”) 
82 Id.
83 Id. (“The organizational culture may promote taking responsibility for the consequences 
of actions, thereby increasing the probability that individuals will behave ethically. Alterna-
tively, the culture may diffuse responsibility for the consequences of unethical behavior, 
thereby making such behavior more likely.”).
84 Id.
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practices within the military, could have on military culture. The goal of the 
Bush administration was to develop new “legal policy.” Legal policy can be 
defined as “those policies that shape the administration of justice.”85 That is 
different from offering an interpretation of the law. It is a policy task. As 
one commentator described it, the question is: “What do you think the law 
should be? How do we think the administration of justice should be devel-
oped?”86
It will reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in supporting the 
Geneva Conventions and undermine the protections of the law of war for 
our troops, both in this specific conflict and in general. It has a high cost in 
terms of negative international reaction, with immediate adverse conse-
quences for our conduct of foreign policy. It will undermine public support 
among critical allies, making military cooperation more difficult to sustain. 
Europeans and others will likely have problems with extradition or other 
forms of cooperation in law enforcement, including in bringing terrorists 
to justice. It may provoke some individual foreign prosecutors to investi-
gate and prosecute our officials and troops. It will make us more vulnera-
ble to domestic and international legal challenge and deprive us of impor-
tant legal options.
For example, the Bush administration decided to disregard the 
advice of current and former senior military leaders and decided, as a matter 
of legal policy, that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al-Qaeda de-
tainees or to the treatment of detainees held in Guantánamo. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, a retired Army General, noted with regard to the legal 
policy change proposed that: 
87
Disregarding these insights grounded in the intricacies of military 
culture, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez noted that “the argument based 
on military culture fails to recognize that our military remain bound to apply 
the principles of GPW because that is what you [the President] have di-
rected them to do.”88
85 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 23 (citing Philip D. Zelikow, Legal Policy in the Twilight 
War, 28 ABA NAT’L SECURITY L. REP. 2, 10 (July 2006), available at http://www.
abanet.org/natsecurity/nslr.shtml#volume_26).
This worldview fails to recognize the insights of orga-
nizational culture theory which posits that organizational cultures are resis-
tant to changes that fail to respect deep-seeded practices, and that organiza-
tional cultures are responsive to the actions of leaders. Colin Powell was not 
the only prominent individual to criticize the Bush administration’s ap-
proach. Former Navy Judge Advocate General John Hutson described the 
86 Zelikow, supra note 85, at 9 (emphasis in original).
87 Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State to Alberto 
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the 
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan 2–3 (Jan. 26, 2002), 
in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006).
88 Memorandum from Alberto Gonzalez, supra note 65, at 4.  
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departure from established military law advanced by the Bush administra-
tion as: 
[S]hortsighted, narrow minded, and overly legalistic analysis. It’s too 
clever by half, and frankly, just plain wrong. Wrong legally, morally, prac-
tically, and diplomatically. Once [Gonzales] reduced his legal analysis to 
simply the Geneva Conventions don’t apply to terrorists without explain-
ing what law, if any does apply, he created a downward spiral of unruli-
ness from which we have not yet pulled out.89
Hutson further noted that “[a] careful, honest reading reveals that the legal 
analysis of the January 2002 memo is very result oriented. It appears to start 
with the conclusion we don’t want the Geneva Conventions to apply in the 
present situation, and then it reverse engineers the analysis to reach that 
conclusion.”90
Political appointees at the top of the defense hierarchy transmitted 
the controversial policies detailed above throughout all levels of the military 
organization. In a policy memo, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
stated, “[t]he United States has determined that Al Qaida and Taliban indi-
viduals under control of the United States are not entitled to prisoner of war 
status for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. . . . [T]he Com-
batant commanders shall transmit this order to subordinate commanders, 
including commander, Joint Task Force 160, for implementation.”91 He 
further noted “[t]he Combatant Commanders shall, in detaining Al Qaida 
and Taliban individuals under control of the United States, treat them hu-
manely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, 
in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.”92
89 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney Gener-
al of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Jan. 6, 
2005) (testimony of John D. Hutson, Dean and President of Franklin Pierce Law Center), 
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/hutsontestimony.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
This “military necessity” clause suggests that an exception to the 
law could be made based on any grounds that would rise to the level of 
“military necessity,” however that phrase was interpreted by those detaining 
al-Qaeda and Taliban members. This was a significant departure from U.S. 
policy and precedent, a point even John Yoo recognized when he noted that 
“United States practice in post-1949 conflicts reveals several instances in 
which our military forces have applied [the Geneva Conventions] as a mat-
ter of policy, without acknowledging any legal obligation to do so. These 
90 Id.
91 Memorandum from Donald A. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def. to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Re: Status of the Taliban and Al Qaida (Jan. 19, 2002), available at 
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
92 Id.
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cases include the Wars in Korea and Vietnam and the interventions in Pa-
nama and Somalia.”93
This is a substantial departure from years of military law and train-
ing which, according to the definitive military field manual on the subject, 
“has held that the Geneva Conventions apply and guide the conduct of U.S. 
military personnel in all international war-conflict situations.”94 This depar-
ture from settled practice had an impact on the military’s organizational 
culture and the behavior of organizational members. For example, on Octo-
ber 11, 2002, the Commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention center sent 
his theater superior a memo requesting that he approve certain interrogation 
techniques, techniques which had previously been viewed as illegal and 
contrary to the military’s accepted practices.95 The request include a legal 
review by the commander’s Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) who, despite being 
a member of the military, relied in large part on the directives from politi-
cally appointed attorneys with no ties to the military’s organizational cul-
ture. The SJA found no violations of applicable federal law.96 The request 
from the Guantánamo Bay detention center commander and associated legal 
document represented “a distinct departure from Army custom, training, and 
policy as embodied in Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interro-
gation. This Army policy manual is enforced by the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), 18 U.S.C. § 2340,” making it binding as a legal 
document.97
Organizational cultures do not change without significant resis-
tance,98 and in fact oftentimes display “defensive routines” that prevent 
culture changes from coming about.99
93 Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense, Re: Ap-
llication of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, at 25 (Jan. 9, 2002), avail-
able at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
In the case of the Bush administra-
94 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 31 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (July 1956)). 
95 Memorandum from Michael B. Dunlavey, Major Gen., to Comm’r, U.S. S. Command, 
Re: Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf.
96 See Memorandum from Daine E. Beaver, Lieutenant Colonel, to Comm’r JTF 170, Re: 
Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc3.pdf. 
97 Huckabee, supra note 71, at 37–38. 
98 Edgar H. Schein, Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies, 41 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 235 (1996) (noting that “new methods of learning or solving problems do not diffuse 
or even become embedded in the organizations that first used them.”). 
99 See CHRIS ARGYRIS AND DONALD A. SCHÖN, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING II: THEORY,
METHOD AND PRACTICE (1996) (noting that organizations have defensive routines that get in 
the way of the kind of second-order learning that may be needed in today’s turbulent world). 
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tion’s interrogation policy, resistance was demonstrated by the U.S. De-
partment of the Navy General Counsel Alberto J. Mora who complained of 
wrongdoing within the Guantánamo detention facility and elsewhere.100
Mora was concerned that interrogation abuses were occurring at Guantána-
mo and that Navy Criminal Investigation Service agents believed acts were 
occurring which were “unlawful and contrary to American values, and that 
discontent over these practices were reportedly spreading among the per-
sonnel at the base.”101 In a memorandum detailing his efforts to fight against 
the legal policy change and its associated impact on military culture, Mora 
noted his initial skepticism regarding such a blatant effort to change settled 
law and organizational practices. He stated that he thought the abuses and 
the memos which supported them were “almost certainly not reflective of 
conscious policy but the product of oversight—a combination of too much 
work and too little time for careful legal analysis or measured considera-
tion.”102 In his words, following a meeting with Department of Defense 
General Counsel Jim Haynes, Mora “left confident that Mr. Haynes, upon 
reflecting on the abuses in Guantanamo and the flaws in the December 2nd
Memo and underlying legal analysis, would seek to correct these mistakes 
by obtaining the quick suspension of the authority to apply the interrogation 
techniques.”103 Weeks later, when the authority to engage in the abusive 
techniques had not been rescinded, Mora “began to wonder whether the 
adoption of the coercive interrogation techniques might not have been the 
product of simple oversight . . . but perhaps a policy consciously adopted—
albeit through mistaken legal analysis—and enjoying at least some support 
within the Pentagon bureaucracy.”104
Mora subsequently confronted for a second time Department of De-
fense Counsel Haynes who informed Mora that the techniques being used in 
Guantánamo were necessary to obtain information from Guantánamo detai-
nees who were thought to be involved with the 9/11 attacks and other ongo-
ing al-Qaeda operations. Mora further asserted, in reference to military cul-
ture and respect for the rule of law, that:
Even if one wanted to authorize the U.S. military to conduct coercive in-
terrogations, as was the case in Guantanamo, how could one do so without 
profoundly altering [the military’s] core values and character? Societal 
education and military training inculcated in our soldiers’ American values 
100 See Memorandum from Alberto J. Mora, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Navy to Vice 
Admiral Albert Church, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Statement for the Record, 
Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues, at 4 (Jul. 7, 2004), in 37
CASE. W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006).
101 Id. at 7. 
102 Id. at 8.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 9. 
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adverse to mistreatment. Would we now have the military abandon these 
values altogether? Or would we create detachments of special guards and 
interrogators, who would be trained and kept separate from other soldiers, 
to administer these practices?105
Mora was not alone in his concerns regarding the palpable impact 
these legal policy changes, coming from political appointees (within the 
Office of Legal Counsel) would have on the military’s organizational cul-
ture. The Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General at the time stated: 
[T]he use of the more extreme interrogation techniques simply is not how 
the U.S. armed forces have operated in recent history. We have taken the 
legal and moral “high-road” in the conduct of our military operations re-
gardless of how others may operate. . . . We need to consider the overall 
impact of approving extreme interrogation techniques as giving official 
approval and legal sanction to the application of interrogation techniques 
that U.S. forces have consistently been trained are unlawful.106
Echoing these sentiments, Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr, the Navy Judge 
Advocate General, questioned whether “the American people [will] find we 
have missed the forest for the trees by condoning practices that, while tech-
nically legal, are inconsistent with our most fundamental values? . . . [I]s 
this the ‘right thing’ for U.S. military personnel?”107 Similarly, the Staff 
Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated, “[t]he 
common thread among our recommendations is concern for servicememb-
ers. OLC does not represent the services; thus, understandably, concern for 
servicemembers is not reflected in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is 
silent on the UCMJ and foreign views of international law.”108
These efforts on the part of senior military attorneys fit within an 
organizational culture theory definition of whistle blowing. Specifically, 
“[w]histle-blowing is the disclosure by current or former employees of il-
legal, immoral, or illegitimate organizational practices to people or organi-
105 Id. at 11. 
106 Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Deputy Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of the Air Force to Mary L. Walker, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Final Report 
and Recommendations of the Working Group to Access the Legal, Policy and Operational 
Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on 
Terrorism, at 2 (Feb. 5, 2003), in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 (2006).
107 Memorandum from Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr, Judge Advocate Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
the Navy to Mary L. Walker, Gen Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Working Group 
Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees (Feb. 6, 2003), in 37 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 615 (2006).
108 Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff Judge Advocate to CMC, U.S. Marine 
Corps to Mary L. Walker, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Working Group Rec-
ommendations on Detainee Interrogations (Feb. 27, 2003), in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
615 (2006).
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zations that may be able to change the practice.”109 Whistle-blowers often-
times “lack the power to change the undesirable practice directly and so [the 
whistle-blower] appeals to others either inside or outside the organiza-
tion.”110 In an organizational theory sense, the senior military attorneys refe-
renced above were whistle-blowers (even if they do not meet the statutory 
requirements for whistle-blower protection).111
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL ETHICS
The important point from an 
organizational culture perspective is how these efforts represented both an 
effort to preserve the existing military culture and an effort to resist the im-
position of a new politically motivated, and perhaps ethically questionable 
organizational culture. 
What do the organizational culture considerations detailed above 
tell us about the role of military lawyers when faced with challenges to mili-
tary culture and legal ethics? The Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
require lawyers to report another lawyer’s misconduct if that conduct “rais-
es a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fit-
ness as a lawyer . . . .”112 Subordinates cannot hide behind a superior or su-
pervisory lawyer’s instructions, unless the supervisory lawyer’s instructions 
reflect a “reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional du-
ty.”113 Despite these rules, Andrew Perlman notes that “research in the area 
of social psychology suggest that, in some contexts, a subordinate lawyer 
will often comply with unethical instructions.”114 Stated differently, there 
seems to be a “significant gap between what the legal ethics rules require 
and how lawyers will typically behave.”115
109 HELLRIEGEL & SLOCUM, supra note 1, at 433 (emphasis omitted). 
In light of these observations, 
what is remarkable about the resistance by some military attorneys to the 
efforts of the Bush administration to alter the military’s ethical warrior ethos 
was the public and strenuous resistance mounted by these members of the 
military. Conventional wisdom would suggest that members of the military, 
accustomed to taking orders, would have merely saluted and executed the 
110 Id. See also Janet P. Near et al., Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-Blowing 
Process?, 42 BUS. ETHICS Q. 219 (2004); Dae-il Nam & David J. Lemak, The Whistle-
Blowing Zone: Applying Barnard’s Insights to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 13 J. MGMT HIST.
33 (2007); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757 
(2007). 
111 See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistle-
Blowing, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 575–78 (2007). 
112 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2004).
113 Id. R. 5.2(b).
114 Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from 
Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2007). 
115 Id. at 452. 
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orders of their superiors. I contend that the fact that they did not is grounded 
in the durability of the military’s organizational culture. 
Military culture is steeped in legal rules and ethical constraints and 
a respect for the role of leaders within the military hierarchy. As Martin 
Cook notes: 
Morally serious and thoughtful military officers feel a deep tension in the 
moral basis of their profession. On the one hand, there are very few places 
in our society where the concepts of duty and service above self have such 
currency. On the other hand, there is the reality that the military exists to 
serve the will of the political leadership of a particular state and will, at 
times, be employed for less-than-grand purposes.116
Another aspect of military culture is the recognized role of leaders 
in shaping the behavior of their subordinates; this leadership role is echoed 
in the literature on organizational culture which posits that leaders play a 
role in establishing and changing organizational culture.117 But if members 
of the military embrace the concept of obedience to orders, what explains 
their resistance to the efforts of the Bush administration? This is an espe-
cially apt question in light of the fact that “[s]tudies on conformity and ob-
edience suggest that professionals, whom we would ordinarily describe as 
‘honest,’ will often suppress their independent judgment in favor of a 
group’s opinion or offer little resistance in the face of illegal or unethical 
demands.”118 Perhaps a key element of the resistance of military lawyer’s 
was the fact that the term culture, as I am using it here, refers to “an evolved 
context . . . rooted in history, collectively held, and sufficiently complex to 
resist many attempts at direct manipulation.”119
Earlier, I noted that the service judge advocates voiced overwhelm-
ing resistance to the efforts of the Bush administration. To fully understand 
what prompted that resistance, it is instructive to look specifically at the 
grounds on which these senior military attorneys advanced their concerns. 
The Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General noted a concern for historic 
Resistance on the part of 
military attorneys was more than just a behavior or a climate; it was rooted 
in deeply held beliefs developed through life within the military organiza-
tional environment and culture. 
116 MARTIN L. COOK, THE MORAL WARRIOR: ETHICS AND SERVICE IN THE U.S. MILITARY 39 
(2004). 
117 See, e.g., Gerard George et al., Organizing Culture: Leader Roles, Behaviors, and Rein-
forcement Mechanisms, 13 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 545 (1999). 
118 Perlman, supra note 114, at 453 (footnote omitted).
119 Daniel R. Denison, What is the Difference Between Organizational Culture and Orga-
nizational Climate? A Native’s Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm Wars, 21 ACAD.
MGMT REV. 619, 644 (1996) (emphasis omitted). 
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practice, the “legal and moral ‘high road,’” and the impact on U.S. forces.120
Similarly, the Navy Judge Advocate General questioned the Bush adminis-
tration’s policies on values grounds, while the Staff Judge Advocate to the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps noted the overarching concern for servi-
cemembers.121 Distilling the central concerns of these senior military attor-
neys provides insights which are grounded in the literature in legal ethics. 
One factor which scholars have noted can impact ethical compliance is 
one’s perception of the impact compliance or non-compliance can have on 
victims. For example, psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted psychologi-
cal experiments to determine when people will follow unethical or immoral 
orders of an authority figure.122 Legal scholars have extrapolated from those 
experiments key variables which will prompt attorneys to not comply with 
ethical rulesone of those key variables is “the physical separation of the 
person carrying out the orders and the victim . . . .”123
Moreover, members of the military in general and senior military 
leaders in particular are trained to take responsibility for their actions and 
not to blame actions (even unfavorable ones) on orders from superiors. 
Thus, while in some contexts subordinates may “discount their responsibili-
ty for their conduct . . . by shifting moral responsibility to the person issuing 
orders,”
The senior military 
lawyers who resisted the Bush administration’s legal policies seem to have 
perceived the victims of these policies as service members, not detainees, 
and their concerns were aimed at those victims who they, as senior military 
leaders, were responsible for leading. 
124 military officers see themselves as the person responsible for 
issuing orders and are trained to resist orders which they believe are unlaw-
ful and to do so without equivocation; military officers do not enjoy the 
luxury of questioning whether (to paraphrase Model Rule 5.2) their superior 
reasonably resolved an arguable question of legality. Unlike an attorney 
who, facing ambiguous legal and ethical duties may frequently find that a 
supervisory lawyer’s instructions are reasonable,125 military officers are 
trained to recognize that the defense of superior orders will not protect them 
from wrongdoing.126
120 Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, supra note 106, at 2.
121 See Memorandum from Kevin M. Sandkuhler, supra note 108.
122 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974). 
123 Perlman, supra note 114, at 462.
124 Id. at 466.
125 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 3–10 (1988).
126 See, e.g., FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 94, ¶ 509(a). The provision reads:
The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a superior au-
thority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in question of its charac-
ter of a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in the trial of an accused indi-
vidual, unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to 
148 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:125
Another factor cited in the legal ethics literature which may prompt 
unethical compliance but which is less applicable to military attorneys is the 
fact that professional and financial self-interest is less relevant to military 
officers. In a civilian setting a subordinate lawyer has much to lose by refus-
ing to obey. For example, in the case of attorneys in the Office of Legal 
Counsel, they stood to lose prestigious politically appointed positions127
with the possibility of successive appointments with greater responsibility128
or even a position in the federal judiciary.129
These observations have implications for the literature on legal eth-
ics, as senior military attorneys in some instances behaved in a manner con-
sistent with the legal ethics and social psychology literature, but in other 
instances departed in their behavior from what the social psychology and 
legal ethics literature would have predicted. First, military attorneys, 
steeped in military culture, values, and training, publicly and strenuously 
objected to orders which ran counter to their ethical obligations, despite the 
fact that those orders came from superior officials. Second, the military at-
torneys viewed other servicemen as the victims of the new policies being 
urged by the Bush administration, suggesting that personalizing the impact 
of legal policy can encourage ethical behavior. Finally, the fact that the se-
nior military attorneys were financially secure and not subject to the allure 
of immediate benefits in the form of promotions or political appointments 
While military attorneys may 
share similar political interests, appointment as a service staff judge advo-
cate is truly the pinnacle of a military attorney’s career. Thus, military at-
torneys in general, and senior military attorneys specifically, were not only 
steeped in a military culture which armed them to resist controversial poli-
cies, but they also did not face the type of professional and financial con-
cerns which could have moderated their resistance; in fact, their job security 
emboldened them. 
know that the act ordered was unlawful. In all cases where the order is held not to 
constitute a defense to an allegation of war crime, the fact that the individual was 
acting pursuant to orders may be considered in mitigation of punishment.
Id.
127 See, e.g., Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, 
and National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 644 (2007) (“While government 
lawyers do not bill by the hours, they do compete for power, prestige, and influence. In the 
national security arena, government lawyers compete for influence on decision-makers by 
signaling their willingness to tolerate conduct that is close to the line of legality.”). See also
Peter Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and Cor-
porate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939 (2006). 
128 John Yoo was floated as a possible Assistant Attorney General candidate to head the 
Office of Legal Counsel. 
129 Head of the Office of Legal Counsel Jay Bybee went on to be appointed as a judge in 
the Ninth Circuit, while Department of Defense General Counsel Jim Haynes was unsuccess-
fully nominated for a judgeship on the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
2009] ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 149
reinforces the legal ethics literature’s predictions regarding professional and 
financial self interest. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this essay I have outlined some key points of intersection be-
tween the social scientific literature on organizational culture and the legal 
ethics literature. First, I detailed a framework for assessing organizational 
culture and detailed how organizational culture reflects more than rules and 
structure within an organization, but rather represents deeper values, prac-
tices, and ways of thinking. Organizational culture is a response to external 
factors and is exhibited most strongly in an organization’s need to survive. 
Organizational culture is difficult to change, but, as the examples above 
illustrate, it can be modified or sustained through power, status, rewards, 
and other mechanisms. Second, the examples detailed above demonstrate 
how the Bush administration tried unsuccessfully to exercise control over a 
military culture which was resistant to its legal policy initiatives. This effort 
at control manifested itself in the creation of the military commissions in 
2001, an attempt to minimize the influence of military attorneys in 2003, 
and efforts to exercise political control over military commissions in 2006. 
Finally, members of the military successfully resisted these efforts to modi-
fy their organizational culture and exercise greater political control over the 
military through legal policy innovations. This resistance was accomplished 
through objections to orders which ran counter to military values. Taken 
together, these observations suggest that the literature on organizational 
culture can provide insights into the literature on legal ethics and political 
control of the military specifically and political control of bureaucracies 
more generally.
